A technical incident forced the Swiss ANSP Skyguide to initiate a ‘clear the sky’ procedure in Zurich early on the 21st of June. The ANSP communicated clearly via three press releases, stating that safety was ensured at all times. Putting this incident in relation to two earlier issues raises a question: is a pattern forming?
According to the latest information available, the issue affected the radar display systems used by air traffic controllers (ATCOs) in the control centre in Zurich. The ANSP explained how a no-fly-zone, created to protect the peace talks between the US and Iran, was the catalyst: “The disruption was triggered by the integration of the visualisation of the restricted airspace over the Bürgenstock area. This was implemented at short notice because the decision to proceed with the conference was only confirmed on Saturday, 20 June.”
Creating a restricted area is a routine operation and Skyguide will have to explain how it could lead to such a result, and the incident will likely be investigated by the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Aviation (FOCA). Until the causes are clearly identified, it makes no sense to speculate.
Cause or coincidence?
It is the third time this year that Skyguide’s operations have been affected by technical issues:
- 21 June 2026: Clear the sky in Zurich
- 22 April 2026: 30% capacity reduction at Zürich approach due to coordination issues
- 27 January 2026: Clear the sky in Geneva after a software update
Skyguide should be commended for handling such incidents safely and for communicating transparently. However, three technical incidents in six months raise questions. Is there a pattern or is it just bad luck?
The incident in Geneva was related to the deployment of a new software version, which is another routine operation. The incident in June seems to stem from the creation of a no-fly-zone, an operation that happens every day.
Innovation vs. stability
Skyguide is a very progressive ANSP and the virtual centre project initiated many changes in their technical systems’ architecture. It is unclear if this plays a direct role in the incidents but there could be a question of focus. The ATM industry needs innovation and changes, and virtualisation is certainly one important step. However, ANSPs must also safeguard daily operations and manage both the present and future.
Skyguide’s systems are developed by its subsidiary SkySoft-ATM, which maintains close cooperation with the ANSP. The level of automation is very advanced and the system offers a lot of features supporting ATCOs in managing the high traffic load that exists in the confined Swiss airspace. Medium-term safety nets, CPDLC, support of free route airspace, and coordination tools are very efficient measures, to name just a few.
When system providers work very closely with an ANSP or are their subsidiary, it allows for a high level of team integration and the resulting systems are highly adapted. This strategy makes it possible to adjust the systems to the exact requirements of ATCOs. ‘Off the shelf’ systems from larger providers can be customised to a certain extent, but not as much as a custom-made system.
On one hand, this tight integration likely helps solve technical problems rapidly, but it could also be a contributing factor adding to the pressure on smaller system providers. Certification makes it impossible for Skyguide and SkySoft-ATM to cut corners and the operation is safe, but the number of recent system related incidents must be considered seriously.
The broader context
It is also worth noting that this series of incidents has happened during a time of change for the ANSP. Götz Ardey has served as Skyguide’s CTO since September 2025 and a change of leadership will come to SkySoft-ATM later this year. As highlighted by Skyguide’s CEO Peter Merz in our recent interview, the company is undergoing transformation. All scenarios are on the table and for the technological aspect, this includes a make or buy decision.
A single incident should not directly influence such a fundamental decision but if there really is an underlying pattern, it must become part of this discussion. Purchased systems are not intrinsically better or more stable but they are managed in a different way. Operating a system or being part of the development process are definitely not the same.
Whatever happens in the future, Skyguide first needs a short-term stability improvement, even if it means slowing innovation for a while. It is critical to maintain ATCOs confidence in the equipment and avoid putting too much pressure on the operational and engineering staff.
