Wildfires around Bordeaux forced French ANSP DSNA to regulate commercial traffic, reduce en-route capacity, protect critical CNS infrastructure and prepare for the possibility of a service interruption at Bordeaux Airport. Global Airspace Radar spoke with DSNA Chief Operations Officer Guillaume Blandel about how the crisis affected operations, staffing and infrastructure, and what lessons the organisation is drawing from the event.
Q: What was the direct impact of the wildfires on DSNA’s operations, ranging from the Bordeaux Tower/Approach (TWR/APP) to the South-West Area Control Centre?
Regarding the Bordeaux Tower, activity was particularly intense due to the management of firefighting operations. Tower controllers managed priorities by occasionally regulating commercial flights to maintain operational flexibility for Civil Security operations. Priority was given to these activities, sometimes at the expense of commercial aviation through traffic regulation measures.
Additional resources were also mobilised to increase our air traffic control capacity, particularly to handle the extensive coordination required.
Prefecture services coordinated and directed emergency response teams, while the DGAC joined the crisis unit to highlight critical points requiring protection, both at the airport and remote sites.
Q: Did you have to modify airspace organisation, sector configurations, capacity or operating hours?
We downgraded certain airspace sectors from Class C to Class D. This enabled firefighting operations close to the airport without too many constraints on scheduled traffic. Firefighting operations are conducted under VFR and, in Class C airspace, VFR traffic must be separated from IFR traffic. In Class D, ATC provides traffic information instead.
Regarding the South-West Control Centre, our service capacity was 10–15% lower than the levels indicated in the EUROCONTROL Network Operations Portal, due to the absence of staff members who had to evacuate their families. The smoke plume did not present any threat to the en-route traffic.
Q: Like you said, the crisis affected not only the airspace but also DSNA personnel. How did you adjust staffing levels?
We implemented a business continuity plan to organise services and limit on-site staff to the absolute minimum. We arranged hotel accommodation for some staff members who had been forced to evacuate to locations quite far from Bordeaux.
The main safety concerns were smoke and odors. We adjusted our air conditioning systems to limit the intake of outside air and provided our air traffic controllers and other staff on site with FFP3 masks.
Throughout the crisis, we witnessed the steadfast commitment of our controllers, engineers and managers.
Q: Did the fires threaten buildings and other assets, especially in the Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) domain?
Prefecture services protected critical CNS facilities by deploying military personnel and dedicating specific firefighting units to defend certain sites. We had to further reduce our capacity and service levels because the fires threatened a key radio transmission and reception site.
In the aftermath, we’ve seen that the flames were only a few hundred metres away. The installation continued to function but we preferred to switch to the backup system nevertheless. It would have taken months to rebuild such an infrastructure.
DSNA has 700 remote sites with radar, radio and navigation equipment across all French territory. Wildfires and other phenomena are a threat to such equipment, and to the communication, power supply and monitoring infrastructure they require. The impact on this infrastructure can be far-reaching. The radio site I mentioned earlier also has a few receivers and transmitters used by the Brest Control Centre and some sectors there could not be grouped because of our decision not to use this site.
Q: Bordeaux Airport remained operational despite the proximity of the fires and evacuation orders. How close did you come to suspending operations?
We came quite close to a service interruption when authorities ordered the evacuation of the Mérignac area. An interruption of air traffic services would likely have occurred had the fires moved any closer to the airport complex.
Q: What are the key lessons the DSNA has drawn from this event? Do you expect these to lead to changes in procedures, contingency planning, infrastructure or coordination mechanisms for future large-scale emergencies?
We have initiated a review of lessons learned regarding this matter, but we will immediately inform all prefectures about isolated sites under their jurisdiction so that they are identified as sensitive points.
We were well prepared to provide protective equipment to our staff and we even provided FFP3 masks to other stakeholders. The adjustment to local infrastructure, air-conditioning and ventilation worked well too and we are ready to protect our staff in the event of further emergencies.
What we can’t do at the moment is transfer jurisdiction from one control centre to another. Moving controllers from Bordeaux to Brest would be possible, even if not easy at a social level, but transferring the access to the required CNS infrastructure is not yet feasible.
